Real Madrid’s ‘magic’ win: tactical analysis

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Real Madrid again snatched Champions League glory from the jaws of defeat, to book a place in a record 18th European Cup final. Bayern Munich were edging towards full-time and Wembley, having taken the lead through a magnificent strike from Alphonso Davies. But, with time running out, a series of substitutions from both Carlo Ancelotti and Thomas Tuchel preceded the dramatic conclusion, in which Joselu came off the bench to score twice for an ecstatic Madrid.

His first goal came after an uncharacteristic fumble by Manuel Neuer, whose goalkeeping had done so much to thwart Madrid up to that point. The second, in the 91st minute, was awarded after deliberation from the VAR officials following a possible offside. And still there was more drama to come.

Bayern were left to rue the lack of a VAR decision at the other end, when Matthijs de Ligt put the ball in the back of the net in the 13th minute of added time. The assistant referee had immediately raised his flag on what was a tight offside call – an error compounded when the referee immediately blew his whistle, meaning that play had effectively stopped just before De Light’s finish, so the offside could not be reviewed.

Nonetheless, Madrid were the more threatening team on the night, with an expected goals figure of 3.37. Their supporters have seen it all before, but reaching the Champions League final will always raise the now retractable roof off the Santiago Bernabéu Stadium.

How the managers saw it

“It’s hard to explain,” said Ancelotti. “Impossible to explain. It’s the magic of this club in this competition, at this stadium and with these fans.”

“We are almost through,” said Tuchel. “It’s almost there and there was a very unusual mistake from our best player [Neuer] for the equaliser, then we conceded the second one in stoppage time.

“Then we scored one and there was a disastrous decision from the linesman and the referee. It feels like a betrayal in the end. There was a huge fight. We left everything on the pitch and we were almost there. Now we say congratulations to Real Madrid.”

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have picked out the key tactical points from this clash of the Champions League titans…

Starting line-ups

Real MadridBayern Munich

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Real Madrid4-4-2

Bayern Munich4-2-3-1

13Andriy Lunin

1Manuel Neuer

23Ferland Mendy

6Joshua Kimmich

6Nacho

4Matthijs de Ligt

22Antonio Rüdiger

15Eric Dier

2Dani Carvajal

40Noussair Mazraoui

5Jude Bellingham

27Konrad Laimer

8Toni Kroos

45Aleksandar Pavlovic

18Aurélien Tchouaméni

7Serge Gnabry

15Federico Valverde

42Jamal Musiala

7Vinícius Júnior

10Leroy Sané

11Rodrygo

9Harry Kane

Breaking down the 4-4-2 blocks

As in the first leg, both teams utilised a 4-4-2 block when defending. With neither team consistently pressing high, they were both tasked with breaking down this block. Bayern’s 4-4-2 (below) had Jamal Musiala remaining high with Harry Kane in the first line, while both wingers worked back to track Madrid’s full-backs. When Davies came on for the injured Serge Gnabry after 27 minutes, Bayern’s left side was strengthened defensively, with Madrid searching for a way to attack the opposite wide area.

Against Bayern’s 4-4-2 block, Madrid were almost forming a 3-5-2 attacking shape (below), with Toni Kroos dropping out to the left, as he so often does. Both full-backs pushed on, with Jude Bellingham and Federico Valverde moving inside to support, ahead of what became a single pivot in Aurélien Tchouaméni. Vinícius acted as the central threat in the first half, with Rodrygo roaming and drifting into new areas, attacking both sides. Valverde and Dani Carvajal occasionally swapped roles, while Bellingham was influential in the left inside channel.

Out of possession, Madrid’s 4-4-2 block (below) operated similar to Bayern’s, leaving Rodrygo and Vinícius high as the first line. Bellingham and Valverde filled wide-midfield roles, tracking any full-back movements, rotations or forward runs – even if that meant working beyond their own full-back. As Madrid’s second line defended so narrow, it limited Bayern’s access into their number 10, Musiala, with Antonio Rüdiger ready to spring out of the back line when needed.

Leroy Sané and initially Gnabry – later Davies – held the width for Bayern, attempting to stretch Madrid’s back line across the pitch (below). Kane operated between the centre-backs, with Konrad Laimer, Aleksandar Pavlovic and Musiala often marked, especially as Rodrygo worked deeper. In their best moments of the first half, Joshua Kimmich’s inward movements from right-back helped Bayern progress, getting away from Bellingham to act as a second number 10. This was ideal when Musiala had taken his player across, opening access into the front line, but Bayern’s final ball was an issue in the first half.

Second-half adaptations

In the second half, Sané moved much narrower from the right, acting as a second 10 with Musiala (below). Kimmich then advanced and held the width more. Musiala’s dropping helped link the double pivot and back line into advanced teammates. Noussair Mazraoui rarely pushed forward from left-back, allowing Davies to stay 1v1 in bigger spaces against Carvajal. This paid off when Bayern took the lead through Davies’ superb, bending effort, after he had cut inside Carvajal. As with the first half, though, Bayern had promising moments, but lacked the final ball that was desperately needed to see off the Spanish champions.

Madrid also adapted in the second half, as Vinícius moved over to the left. Ancelotti’s game plan then became clear: work the ball to the left and allow Vinícius to drive, dribble and run at the Bayern back line. For a period he was unplayable, beating his opponents, working attempts and flipping the momentum in Madrid’s favour. He had the beating of Kimmich, but also exploited moments when the Germany international had advanced, putting him in 1v1s against De Ligt (below).

Madrid provided support around Vinícius, adding combinations to his final-third play. Although on occasion this helped him progress forward, the close connections did sometimes hinder his progress, attracting Bayern players who killed the spaces he needed to drive into (below). With no central-forward threat either, Bayern’s centre-backs could be very aggressive in their positioning and support around Kimmich. Sané’s recoveries back also provided support, alongside the closest of Bayern’s double pivot, with Madrid missing a central, focal point in attack.

Tuchel attempted to see the game out by converting to a back five, bringing on Kim Min-jae for Sané after 76 minutes. Davies or Mazraoui then dropped out to track the runs of Carvajal or Mendy. This allowed Kimmich and Kim to protect the inside channels against Vinícius and Brahim Díaz, who Ancelotti brought on for Rodrygo on 81 minutes. At the same time, Joselu replaced Valverde; his presence gave Madrid a focal point around Bayern’s centre-backs, despite their extra player in the back line (below).

Against Bayern’s 5-3-1-1 defensive block (above) another Madrid substitute, Luka Modric, conducted the play, working the ball into the front line with pace and purpose. In typical Madrid fashion, they then produced another stunning European comeback, thanks to Joselu’s poaching. Their opponents in the final, Borussia Dortmund, cannot say they have not been warned.

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Author: The Coaches' Voice