Vincent Kompany tactics and style of play

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By the age of 38, Vincent Kompany had experienced a rollercoaster start to his career as a head coach. Already laden with experience at the very highest level as a player, the Belgian established himself as one of the most promising young coaches in the game. And yet it was still a surprise when he was named Bayern Munich head coach in 2024, coming after he had experienced the setback of Premier League relegation with Burnley.

Kompany began his managerial career as he did his playing days – with his boyhood club, Anderlecht. After two years in Brussels, he left to take over Burnley in the Championship, guiding them to immediate promotion and a title won in impressive style. His team struggled badly in the Premier League, however, and were relegated after spending the entire season in the bottom three. Nonetheless, with Bayern seeking a successor to Thomas Tuchel, Kompany was offered the chance to take over Germany’s most successful club in the summer of 2024.

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed Kompany’s tactics as a head coach, from his time at Burnley, and in the early stages at Bayern…

Playing style

Kompany has favoured variations of 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 as a starting base for his teams, while also playing a 4-4-2 in spells during his time at Anderlecht. The fluidity of his tactical approach, however, has ensured his teams rarely stay rigid in a structure. He wants his teams to dominate possession, to commit numbers to the last line, and to use an aggressive rest defence to suffocate the opposition and sustain attacks. This was evident during his Championship-winning season at Burnley, where they registered the highest average possession (65 per cent) and number of goals (87) in the division.

The structure of his teams is fluid in the build phase, but they often create a 3-2-5 structure, with a back three and double pivot. In the example from Burnley, below, Ian Maatsen narrowed from left-back, while Jordan Beyer became a middle centre-back and Taylor Harwood-Bellis widened to become a right centre-back. Further ahead, Connor Roberts inverted from right-back, forming a double pivot alongside Josh Cullen. This meant Burnley had a secure structure to build, including options to circulate across the back three while maintaining diagonal passing angles to retain and combine. It was a fluid structure, with Maatsen inverting at times to create the double pivot. When he did that, Roberts stayed deeper and narrower as part of the back three.

Burnley’s 3-2-5 could also form through a central midfielder dropping into the back three, while the full-backs advanced on to the last line to pin the opposition’s defensive line. As shown below, midfielder Sander Berge drifted out to create the back-three structure, with full-backs Charlie Taylor and Vitinho (out of picture) advanced high and wide on the last line. Wilson Odobert dropped down alongside Cullen to form the double pivot, with Jacob Bruun Larsen and Lyle Foster narrowing into half-space positions. This ensured that Burnley occupied all five lanes on the last line, to provide a constant threat in behind. Again this structure was fluid, with Cullen also able to drop deeper into the back line, both outside and between centre-backs.

A structural advantage of this shape was the flexibility of the inside forwards, Bruun Larsen and Foster. When Kompany’s teams require space in build-up, players in these positions have tended to stay high and fix the opposition’s back line to create space. They have also had the freedom to drift wider into the vacant space between wide centre-backs and high full-backs. Particularly against compact back-five structures, this enables them to receive while facing forward, to penetrate.

Alternatively, if they draw out a defender with their movement, it creates space in behind for high full-backs to make aggressive out-to-in runs – or space for the central striker to make intelligent runs across on the blind side, in behind the opposition's defensive line.

In especially aggressive moments, Kompany’s teams can also operate as a 2-3-5. This involves the central midfielder staying in the second line, and full-backs advancing higher to push the wide forwards inside, alongside the central striker, to occupy the last line. Alternatively, both full-backs can invert into midfield, with the last line occupied by wide forwards, high central midfielders and the central striker.

Kompany maintained these themes during his early games in charge of Bayern. He adapted, though, to use the ability of goalkeeper Manuel Neuer between the centre-backs (below). With Neuer part of a back three alongside Dayot Upamecano and Kim Min-jae, Bayern were able to keep an additional outfield player in a higher position. Joshua Kimmich inverted into a double pivot alongside Aleksandar Pavlovic, while Raphaël Guerreiro advanced on to the last line. This narrowed Mathys Tel into the half-space position, with Harry Kane, Michael Olise and Serge Gnabry ensuring Bayern occupied all five lanes on the last line.

As a consequence, Kompany’s Bayern have shown an additional degree of fluidity and flexibility. In the example above, Jamal Musiala could drift wider to receive in space and travel forwards using his acceleration and dynamism, with Freiburg’s back line pinned back and Pavlovic and Kimmich staying central to narrow and compact the opposition midfield. Alternatively, Olise could also drop down to create a central box alongside Musiala, Pavlovic and Kimmich, to overload Freiburg centrally.

Final third

Kompany looks to utilise his team’s occupation of all five lanes of the pitch to create space between and in behind the opposition in the final third. The widest players – who can be advanced full-backs or wide-forwards – look to pin the width. This stretches the distances between the opposition’s back line, creating space for runs into the half-space by narrowed inside forwards or advanced midfielders. In the example from a Burnley game below, that is Foster on the ball-side and Bruun Larsen opposite.

This allowed Burnley to exploit any space between opposition defenders, to slide passes in or cross behind the defence. If the opposition back line narrowed excessively to restrict central penetration, it allowed the wide players to attack the space on the outside, to cross or isolate defenders in 1v1 situations. At Bayern, this is a situation where they can utilise the individual creativity of Olise, Gnabry and Musiala.

Another way in which Burnley utilised their occupation of the last line was by opposite movements between the central striker and those occupying the half-space. As a central striker, Ashley Barnes often looked to drop in and pull central defenders out of position, or at the very least occupy their attention. This enabled aggressive runs into the space created in behind, by players occupying the half-space.

In the example below, Roberts – who had rotated inside following a fluid period of possession – received inside the box in a good goalscoring position. Kompany’s Burnley also used these opposite movements in wider areas, timing and disguising movements to exploit space when the opposition were drawn out.

Out of possession

Without the ball, Kompany has preferred his teams to form a 4-4-2 shape, with the ability to press aggressively and drop into a more compact block when necessary. During the 2022/23 Championship season at Burnley, his team pressed aggressively, with the lowest PPDA (7.86) across the division. At Anderlecht and during his Premier League season with Burnley, his sides ranked in line with the league average – perhaps showing a flexibility to his approach, if not a necessity to adapt to tougher opposition.

In aggressive presses, strikers in a 4-4-2 work together, with one pressing the centre-back in possession to force one way, while the other drops into a position to restrict the pivot. The widest players in the midfield four anticipate wider passes and press aggressively on to full-backs in a back four and wide centre-backs in a back three, when required. The full-backs support them from behind and are ready to jump should they need to, once the wide players release.

Central midfielders must possess the intelligence to position between midfielders, as shown by Berge at Burnley, below. They must be able to jump and engage the deepest pivot if the first line is beaten, but also ensure they can screen midfielders on their blind side. 

In a more reserved and passive block, the front two will drop with a deeper line of engagement and prioritise screening the oppositions pivot(s). This enables the distances between the front two, midfield and defensive units to remain minimal, limiting the space for the opposition to penetrate between. Instead, they should be forced into wider areas, from which Kompany’s teams have looked to regain possession or force the opposition longer.

How Kompany evolves his tactical approach at Bayern, in both the Bundesliga and Champions League, will be fascinating to observe. As will the results he achieves with a much higher level of player than he had at his disposal at Anderlecht and Burnley.

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Author: The Coaches' Voice