Simone Inzaghi tactics and style of play

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When Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City faced Simone Inzaghi’s Inter in the 2023 Champions League final, the former were heavy favourites. But while the result was a 1-0 victory for City, that does not tell the story of how Inter’s underdogs were exceptionally difficult to overcome. The reason they came so close to shocking the favourites? They were led by Simone Inzaghi.

In his playing days as a striker (see the video below), Inzaghi had an 11-year spell with Lazio, winning Serie A and three caps for Italy. It was a career that would be the envy of most players, yet he wasn’t even the most successful footballer in his family. Older brother Filippo won trophies galore with Juventus and AC Milan, and scored 25 goals for the national team. When the name Inzaghi was mentioned in the late 1990s and 2000s, ‘Pippo’ was usually the one who sprang to mind.

That has changed. Both brothers went into management – Filippo’s first head-coach role was at AC Milan – but in the dugout it has been Simone who has achieved more.

After retiring as a player, the younger of the Inzaghis spent six years coaching in Lazio’s academy system, before he became first-team manager in 2016. In the following five seasons, he led the club to an Italian Cup, two Italian Super Cups and reached the last 16 of the Champions League. He took over at Inter in 2021, and in his first two seasons won the Italian Cup and Italian Super Cup, as well as reaching that Champions League final.

Then, in 2023/24, his team kicked on domestically to claim the Scudetto – only Inter’s second title in 14 years. Impressively, it was wrapped up with five games to spare, in a San Siro derby against Milan – much to the delight of Inter’s supporters. 

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed the tactics that Inzaghi has used to great effect at Lazio and Inter…

Back-three build-up

Inzaghi has almost exclusively favoured a 3-5-2 shape at both Lazio and Inter. In his first eight seasons as a head coach, his teams have averaged at least 50 per cent possession or higher. They don’t necessarily dominate the ball, but they consistently have at least an equal share of possession. And that comes with an attacking edge. 

Inzaghi’s teams look to build through the thirds with short passes, where possible, but will always look to play forward and penetrate as a priority. Should the opposition press high and leave significant spaces between the lines, an Inzaghi team is happy to skip the closest players and break lines with passes from the centre-backs.

If the available spaces are even further up the pitch, they will play more direct after an initial, shorter build. They will look to draw the opposition forward, taking advantage of spaces left available. This versatility has been a key in-possession feature of his sides.

At Lazio, his wing-backs moved high, receiving in line or beyond the opposition's midfield unit. As such, they were also positioned to support direct passes into the front line. Lazio’s deepest pivot, Lucas Leiva, would operate ahead of the middle centre-back, on occasion dropping into the back line as an extra player. The two number eights then adapted to their surroundings – one dropping to become the pivot – should Lucas drop between the centre-backs. 

If the pivot stayed ahead of the back line, the remaining central midfielders often worked in opposite directions. They would look to drag player-oriented markers away, creating more space for the pivot and centre-backs to build. Any forward run was also complimented by one of Lazio’s centre-forwards dropping, usually in the opposite inside channel (below). These movements pulled the opposition apart; this allowed for shorter passes, but also the kind of incisive play associated with Inzaghi’s Lazio.

With Inzaghi’s Inter, there has been more fluidity, rotations and unpredictable movements. This is in no small part due to the quality of players he has had at his disposal. These include Marcelo Brozovic and the converted Hakan Calhanoglu, who have acted as the single pivot. Both are strong ball-players capable of receiving under pressure and readjusting their positions to help progress forward. 

Inter’s versatile centre-backs have also facilitated rotations. One example is the middle centre-back moving into midfield as an extra pivot during sustained build-up. The pivot has also rotated out at times, to try to drag their marker into different areas. Inter will sometimes also build with a converted back four – especially inside their own penalty area – with the three centre-backs and one wing-back supporting the goalkeeper. 

Further rotations around the pivot and middle centre-back also occur, especially as one of the wing-backs drops. Here, the wide centre-back may move forward, on and off the ball, as the number eights drop out of the way, or widen to take over from the dropping wing-back. The number eight on the far side then widens, creating more central spaces for back-line runs forward (below).

When Inter lose possession, however, some of their defenders can be caught out, especially if they have advanced quite high in central spaces. 

Attacking output

Naturally, Lazio and Inter’s build-up style under Inzaghi has had an impact on how they enter and create in the final third. Inzaghi’s Lazio often ranked among the highest in Serie A for through balls, looking to quickly penetrate after their initial build phase.

The stretching movements from the front line were key here, especially with Ciro Immobile such a consistent goal threat for Lazio (especially in the 2019/20 season, when he scored 36 in 37 games). Supporting movements from Immobile’s centre-forward partner helped occupy the other opposing centre-back, allowing him to isolate his marker and feed on the service provided. Lazio’s number eights, meanwhile, provided driving runs, box-to-box threats and passing that exposed spaces beyond.

When the forwards curved their runs around the opposition centre-backs, it allowed the wing-backs to run inside – especially if the number eight on that same side was slightly deeper, having supported the build-up (below).

Should the passing work around the opposition back line, narrow runs beyond could come from the centre-forward pair. One forward would provide the movement to penetrate, while the other was a central goal threat – a key benefit of playing with two centre-forwards. In these moments, the box-to-box support of Inzaghi’s number eights – and on occasion the opposite wing-back – was a feature.

Compared to Lazio, Inter have had more fluidity. Changes of position – particularly rotations in the wide areas or inside channels – have yielded plenty of crosses. They recorded the most crosses in the 2022/23 and 2023/24 Serie A campaigns, and the second-most in 2021/22. With a back-five formation, the wing-backs have provided many of these balls, with the likes of Federico Dimarco, Denzel Dumfries, Matteo Darmian and Ivan Perisic regularly crossing.

Because rotations can involve a wing-back, advancing wide centre-back and number eight, plus a dropping centre-forward, players other than the wing-backs have also delivered crosses. Right-sided number eight Nicolò Barella, for example, has overlapped to get into crossing positions. There, he has also worked off the dropping movements of the closest centre-forward, with forwards runs made in return by the pivot (below).

Wide centre-back Alessandro Bastoni has also provided crosses. Pushing forward from the back three, he has taken advantage – untracked – of space made by the wing-back on his side pulling the opposing full-back out of shape. With Barella also providing a threat from the right, Inter’s fluidity from the wide areas differs from Inzaghi’s Lazio. It offers a real attacking threat. 

Out of possession

With Lazio, Inzaghi often made use of mid and low-blocks. Out of possession, the 3-5-2 became a 5-3-2. The back line of five was supported by three screening midfielders and two centre-forwards ahead. The front line covered central access, where possible forcing the ball away from the opposing pivot. The forwards would then individually press outward, attempting to lock the ball to one side. Opponents would often carry the ball wide anyway, as the main available spaces against a 5-3-2 are, in the first instance, in wide areas. From there, a wide trap would be set, where the wing-back and closest eight jumped to aggressively engage the ball. A wide centre-back would also press out in support, when needed. 

If opponents tried to work the ball back inside, the midfield trio would jump out and press. This was often the trigger to move from a low block into more of a mid-block – or, after a period of protecting their goal, to increase the pressing. That would mean the central of the midfield trio jumped out, with the number eight closest to the ball joining and supporting any back-pressure from the front line. The number eight furthest from the ball would then narrow, covering the central jump from midfield (below).

With Inter, Inzaghi has operated similarly, albeit with the use of a mid-block much more often. The 5-3-2 has been maintained when defending, with a very similar style and wide pressing trap to that seen with Lazio. 

Instead of the wing-back jumping out to press, Inter’s closest number eight has pressed into the wide areas. This is because, in some matches, Inter’s two central forwards have focused more on screening the opposition pivot(s), rather than pressing wider, as seen at Lazio. With access to the central midfield blocked, the ball is much more likely to move wider when teams try to break Inter’s 5-3-2. As the most obvious space for the in-possession team against a 5-3-2 comes in full-back areas, Inter’s eights can confidently jump early, knowing where the ball will be progressed. 

From here, the wide centre-back will then follow and defend into the midfield spaces. This is especially the case if an opposing attacker looks to drop in to receive in the space vacated by Inter’s jumping eight (below).

This keeps Inter’s wing-backs as part of the back line, narrowing to cover any inside passes from the opposition. Should Inzaghi want to focus on central compactness, then the wing-backs will jump out to press, thus keeping the central midfield intact, as seen with Lazio.

These are tactics that have served him well, first in Rome and now Milan. Leading Inter to a 20th Serie A title has given the club the right to have two stars on their shirt – only the second team in Italian football, after Juventus, to earn that honour. The biggest Inter star, though, is arguably the coach on the San Siro touchline.

To learn more about football tactics and gain insights from coaches at the top of the game, visit CV Academy

Author: The Coaches' Voice